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The United States Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Lane v. Franks[1] stands for 
an important, albeit relatively unremarkable and uncontroversial, proposition in 
the annals of public employee speech jurisprudence: Under the First Amendment, 
public employees are protected from retaliation by public employers when the 
employee, after having been subpoenaed to testify, provides truthful sworn 
testimony on a matter of public concern, when testifying is not part of his or her 
ordinary job responsibilities.[2] Indeed, to state Lane’s holding suggests its 
validity.  Thus, as far as Supreme Court decisions go, Lane was an easy case, with 
Justice Sotomayor writing for a unanimous Court,[3] three Justices concurring,[4]  
and a relatively brief and straightforward analysis. 
 
Easy case or not, the Lane Court’s majority opinion is noteworthy for both how it 
arrived at its holding, and what it did not decide. First, the opinion did not 
challenge, but instead, gave a narrow reading to the Court’s 2006 decision in 
Garcetti v. Ceballos[5] which held that, when a public employee speaks as part of 
his or her official duties, the employee is speaking as an employee and not as a 
citizen, and that, therefore, the speech is not protected from adverse employment 
action under the First Amendment.[6]  Second, the Lane opinion, in reaching a 
result protecting public employee speech, resurrected and applied principles from 
its seminal decision in Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School 
District 205, Will County,[7]  i.e., that speech by public employees on matters 
related to their employment holds special value precisely because those employees 
gain knowledge of matters that are of public concern through their employment—
which may not be possessed by non-employees—and that, as such, the public at 
large benefits from constitutionally protecting that speech and not allowing 
retaliation against those same employees.[8] Third, the opinion did not grapple 
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with, and expressly left for another day, a more difficult doctrinal and policy 
question than the one it decided, i.e., whether public employees will be protected 
from public employer retaliation when they testify under the above circumstances 
and in the same manner when testifying is part of their ordinary job 
responsibilities.[9]   Also, due to the narrowness of its Opinion, the Court did not 
answer other related questions.[10] 
 
This Article, drawing from and applying the principles relied upon by the Court in 
reaching its decision in Lane, will address the unanswered and related questions 
embedded in the Lane decision.  As alluded to above, those principles include 
recognizing public employees’ rights to enjoy job security when exercising their 
First Amendment rights, as well as their important role in reporting on matters of 
public concern and testifying truthfully under oath in judicial and other public 
proceedings.  These open questions, which were either expressly reserved inor 
raised by the facts underlyingthe Court’s opinion in Lane and this Article’s 
answers to those questions, are as follows: 
 
 What is the significance, if any, of the Lane Court’s use on multiple occasions of the term 
“ordinary job responsibilities” in contrast to the Garcetti Court’s reference to “official 
duties” concerning limiting First Amendment protection for public employee speech?  
Although not free from doubt, the Supreme Court’s use of the term “ordinary job 
responsibilities” in Lane will likely narrow the scope of public employee speech excepted 
from First Amendment protection. 
 What result if a public employee, as part of his or her ordinary job responsibilities and 
pursuant to a subpoena or as a representative of his or her employer, provides truthful 
sworn testimony about a matter of public concern?  As in Lane, and assuming Garcetti 
continues to set a threshold limit on the free speech rights of public employees, a public 
employee’s testimony under these circumstances should be protected under the First 
Amendment, subject to Pickering balancing. 
 What result if a public employee testifies as part of those same ordinary job 
responsibilities about the same subject matter, but does so voluntarily?  The answer 
should be no different, i.e., the employee’s speech should be protected under the First 
Amendment, but again subject to Pickering balancing. 
 What result if the content of a public employee’s sworn truthful testimony does not 
relate to a matter of public concern?  Although a close question, given the importance of 
promoting truth-seeking in judicial and administrative proceedings, public employees 
should be protected from retaliation by their employers even when the content of their 
testimony does not involve a matter of public concern. 
 What result if a public employee’s testimony is false or erroneous?  Generally speaking, 
the public employee should not be protected from adverse employment action under the 
First Amendment. 
 What result if, during testimony, the public employee unnecessarily discloses sensitive, 
confidential or privileged information? The public employee should not be protected from 
adverse employment action based on his or her testimony. 




 What result if a public employee admits to wrongdoing while testifying? As long as the 
public employee is afforded progressive discipline and due process, the wrongdoing has a 
nexus to the employee’s job responsibilities, and the employee has not been granted 
immunity in exchange for his or her testimony, the public employee’s admission of 
wrongdoing while testifying will constitute cause for adverse employment action against 
the employee. 
 
Part II of this Article will discuss the Lane case in detail, summarizing the facts, 
lower court proceedings and the Supreme Court’s decision, including both the 
majority and concurring opinions.  Part III will discuss and answer in detail the 
above-listed unanswered and related questions stemming from Lane, reaching 
both public employer-favoring and public employee-favoring results guided by the 
principles that drove the Court’s decision in Lane.  Part IV will conclude that 
reliance on the legal and policy principles emphasized by the Court in Lane will 
further the values underlying the protection of public employee speech in the 
sworn testimony context. 
II. LANE V. FRANKS 
 
A. The Facts and Lower Court Proceedings 
 
Edward Lane was a public employee hired by Central Alabama Community College 
(“CACC”) on probationary status to serve as its Director of Community Intensive 
Training for Youth (“CITY”), a program for underprivileged youth.[11]  As Director, 
Lane’s job responsibilities included managing the day-to-day operation of the CITY 
program, hiring and firing employees, and overseeing the program’s finances.[12]  
 
Like many public agencies, the CITY program faced difficult financial times.[13]   
In reviewing the program’s finances, Lane learned that Suzanne Schmitz, an 
Alabama State Representative employed by the program, had not been reporting 
to her assigned CITY office.[14] Lane discussed the matter with Schmitz but was 
unsuccessful in getting her to change this behavior.[15] When Lane took the matter 
to CACC’s president and its attorney, they warned Lane that firing Schmitz could 
have negative consequences for both him and CACC[16] presumably because of 
Schmitz’s status as a state representative. 
 
These warnings notwithstanding, Lane went back to Schmitz and instructed her to 
show up at her assigned office in Huntsville to perform her job as a counselor.[17]   
When Schmitz refused, Lane fired her.[18]   Schmitz then told a co-worker that she 
would “get [Lane] back for firing her,”[19]  and that, if Lane ever appeared before 
the state legislature to request money for the CITY program, “she would tell him, 
‘[y]ou’re fired.’”[20]  
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Schmitz’s termination led to several investigations into her conduct while she was 
employed with the CITY program, including one by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation.[21] Lane eventually testified before a grand jury concerning his 
reasons for firing Schmitz.[22] A little over a year later, the grand jury indicted 
Schmitz on multiple counts of mail fraud and theft relating to her having allegedly 
and improperly taken money from a program receiving federal funds.[23] The 
indictment alleged that Schmitz had received over $175,000 in federal funds even 
though she performed little to no work for the CITY program and further alleged 
that Schmitz had submitted false time sheets concerning the amount of hours she 
worked and the nature of the services she rendered.[24]  
 
Schmitz’s federal court trial commenced approximately six months after the 
indictment.[25]   Having been subpoenaed, Lane testified at trial about the events 
leading up to his decision to fire Schmitz.[26] The jury was unable to reach a 
verdict, thereby causing the prosecutors to retry Schmitz.[27] Lane testified at 
Schmitz’s retrial.[28] This time, the jury convicted Schmitz on all but one of the 
multiple counts concerning her having defrauded and stolen money from a 
program receiving federal funds.[29] The district court sentenced Schmitz to thirty 
months in prison, and ordered her to forfeit and make full restitution of the money 
fraudulently stolen from the CITY program.[30]  
 
Meanwhile, the CITY program continued to experience budgetary difficulties.[31]  
As a result, Lane recommended to CACC’s recently-hired president Steve Franks 
that he (Franks) lay off a number of CITY employees.[32] Franks did so, 
terminating twenty-nine CITY probationary employees, including Lane.[33]   
Because of ambiguity in the employees’ probationary status, Franks quickly 
rescinded all but two of the twenty-nine employees’ terminations.[34] Franks, 
however, did not reinstate Lane, based on Franks’ stated belief that, because Lane 
was a director of the CITY program and not simply an employee, he could be 
treated differently than the other probationary employees.[35] Not long thereafter, 
CACC eliminated the CITY program and terminated its remaining employees.[36]  
 
Lane sued Franks, in both his individual and official capacities, in federal 
court.[37]  Lane alleged that Franks had violated his federal civil and constitutional 
rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the First Amendment by terminating Lane in 
retaliation for having testified against Schmitz.[38]  “Lane sought damages from 
Franks in his individual capacity and sought equitable relief, including 
reinstatement, from Franks in his official capacity.”[39]  




The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Franks[40] and the 
Eleventh Circuit affirmed.[41] The Supreme Court granted certiorari[42] to resolve 
the split of opinions in the courts of appeals[43] on the question of “whether public 
employees may be firedor suffer other adverse employment consequencesfor 
providing truthful subpoenaed testimony outside the course of their ordinary job 
responsibilities.”[44]  
 
B. The Supreme Court’s Decision 
 
 The Outcome/Result 
 
In a unanimous opinion, with three Justices concurring, the Supreme Court 
reversed the Eleventh Circuit’s decision as to Lane’s section 1983 and First 
Amendment claims against Franks’ successor, Burrow, in her official capacity; 
affirmed the decision on qualified immunity grounds as to those same claims 
against Franks in his individual capacity; and remanded the case to the lower 
courts for further proceedings consistent with the Court’s opinion.[45]  
 
 Guiding and Governing Principles 
 
Writing for the Court, Justice Sotomayor foreshadowed the outcome of the 
decision with the opening words of the opinion.[46] She stated “Almost [fifty] 
years ago, this Court declared that citizens do not surrender their First 
Amendment rights by accepting public employment.”[47] Citing to its seminal 
decision in Pickering v. Board of Education,[48]  the Court pointed out that, in the 
context of public employee speech, a “careful balance” is needed “‘between the 
interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public 
concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency 
of the public services it performs through its employees.’”[49]  Similar to 
Pickering, the Lane Court struck the balance in favor of Lane and other public 
employees, holding that the “the First Amendment . . . protects a public employee 
who provided truthful sworn testimony, compelled by subpoena, outside the 
course of his ordinary job responsibilities.”[50]  
 
By leading with and emphasizing the compatibility of public employee speech with 
public employment and the Pickering balancing test, the Court resurrected first 
principles that had been stated, but given short shrift, in its two previous major 
public employee speech casesConnick v. Myers,[51] and Garcetti, which had set 
up threshold barriers to protecting public employees and their speech from 
retaliation by public employers.[52] Thus, in Connick, a case involving a 
questionnaire circulated internally by a disgruntled staff attorney in a prosecutor’s 
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office, the Court clarified its decision in Pickering by holding that no balancing of 
the employee’s interest in speech with the public employer’s interest in efficiently 
providing its public services was necessary, unless the employee first 
demonstrated that the speech involved a matter of public concern.[53] More 
recently in Garcetti, where a mid-level prosecutor prepared an internal 
memorandum as part of his official duties, which described purported misconduct 
by a law enforcement officer in swearing out a warrant affidavit and recommending 
dismissal of the case, [54] the Court determined that the prosecutor was speaking 
as an employee, not as a citizen and, as such, his speech was not protected under 
the First Amendment.[55]  
 
Having set the tone for what was to follow, the Court in Lane reiterated the two-
step analytical framework for evaluating whether public employee speech is 
constitutionally protected, which it had first enunciated in Garcetti: 
 
The first requires determining whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of 
public concern. If the answer is no, the employee has no First Amendment cause of action 
based on his or her employer’s reaction to the speech. If the answer is yes, then the 
possibility of a First Amendment claim arises.  The question becomes whether the 
relevant government entity had an adequate justification for treating the employee 
differently from any other member of the general public.[56]  
 
The Court next restated the distinction between citizen speech and employee 
speech that drove its decision in Garcetti, explaining that although “speech as a 
citizen may trigger protection . . . ‘when public employees make statements 
pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First 
Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their 
communications from employer discipline.’”[57]   At this juncture, the Court again 
stated the narrow question before it, pointing out both what it was deciding and 
what it was not: 
 
It is undisputed that Lane’s ordinary job responsibilities did not include testifying at court 
proceedings . . . For that reason, Lane asked the Court to decide only whether truthful 
sworn testimony that is not part of an employee’s ordinary job responsibilities is citizen 
speech on a matter of public concern. We accordingly need not address in this case 
whether truthful sworn testimony would constitute citizen speech under Garcetti when 
given as part of a public employee’s ordinary job duties, and express no opinion on that 
matter today.[58]  
 
 The Legal Standard Applied 
 
The Court subdivided the first step of the two-step inquiry, analyzing first whether 
Lane’s testimony at Schmitz’s trial constituted speech as a citizen, as opposed to 




speech as an employee, and second, whether Lane’s testimony involved a matter 
of public concern.[59]  As to each issue, the Court did not have any difficulty ruling 
in Lane’s favor. 
 
a. The Citizen Speech v. Employee Speech Issue 
 
As to the citizen speech issue, the Supreme Court started with its conclusion, 
holding that “[t]ruthful testimony under oath by a public employee outside the 
scope of his ordinary job duties is speech as a citizen for First Amendment 
purposes . . . even when the testimony relates to his public employment or 
concerns information learned during that employment.”[60] In so holding, the 
Court disagreed with the Eleventh Circuit and grounded its conclusion on two 
separate bases.[61]  
 
First, the Court took the Eleventh Circuit to task for minimizing “the nature of 
sworn judicial statements,” and for “ignor[ing] the obligation borne by all 
witnesses testifying under oath.”[62] On this point, the Court opined as follows: 
 
Sworn testimony in judicial proceedings is a quintessential example of speech as a citizen 
for a simple reason: Anyone who testifies in court bears an obligation, to the court and 
society at large, to tell the truth.  When the person testifying is a public employee, he may 
bear separate obligations to his employerfor example, an obligation not to show up to 
court dressed in an unprofessional manner.  But any such obligations as an employee are 
distinct and independent from the obligation, as a citizen, to speak the truth.  That 
independent obligation renders sworn testimony speech as a citizen and sets it apart from 
speech made purely in the capacity of an employee.[63]  
 
Second, the Court disagreed with the Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion that, because 
Lane’s testimony was based upon information learned during the course of his 
employment with, or related to his position at CACC and CITY, Garcetti required 
that Lane’s speech be treated as employee, rather than citizen, speech.[64]  On this 
point, the Court distinguished Garcetti by noting that the prosecutor in that case 
had prepared the internal memorandum regarding law enforcement misconduct 
for his supervisors recommending dismissal of a particular case as part of his 
“official responsibilities,” (i.e., as part of the “tasks he was paid to perform” as a 
government employee).[65]  In contrast, the Court characterized Lane’s testimony 
as “speech that simply relates to public employment or concerns information 
learned in the course of public employment.”[66] Although the Lane Court stated 
that “Garcetti said nothing about speech” of the latter kind,[67]  it immediately 
reinforced its holding by noting that “[t]he Garcetti Court made explicit that its 
holding did not turn on the fact that the memo at issue ‘concerned the subject 
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matter of [the prosecutor’s] employment,’ because ‘[t]he First Amendment 
protects some expressions related to the speaker’s job.’”[68]  
 
The Court, having distinguished and clarified its holding in Garcetti, held as to the 
“relatedness/official duties” issue: 
 
[T]he mere fact that a citizen’s speech concerns information acquired by virtue of his 
public employment, does not transform that speech into employeerather than 
citizenspeech.  The critical question under Garcetti is whether the speech at issue is 
itself ordinarily within the scope of an employee’s duties, not whether it merely concerns 
those duties.[69]  
 
The Courtagain, harkening back to Pickering and emphasizing a rationale for 
protecting public employee speech based on information garnered in the course of 
public employment which had been minimized in Garcettifurther bolstered its 
holding as follows: 
 
It bears emphasis that our precedents dating back to Pickering have recognized that 
speech by public employees on subject matter related to their employment holds special 
value precisely because those employees gain knowledge of matters of public concern 
through their employment.  In Pickering, for example, the Court observed that “[t]eachers 
are . . . the members of the community most likely to have informed and definite opinions 
as to how funds allotted to the operation of the schools should be spent.  Accordingly, it 
is essential that they be able to speak out freely without fear of retaliatory dismissal.”[70]  
 
Further supporting its decision concerning the breadth of Garcetti’s holding and 
the importance of public employee speech in corruption cases like Lane, the Court 
noted the anomaly that would occur if the speech often necessary to prosecute 
those cases, i.e., speech learned at work, could not “form the basis for a First 
Amendment retaliation claim.”[71] The Court further noted the “impossible 
position” a public employee would be in if forced to choose between testifying 
truthfully about corruption witnessed in the workplace, and avoiding loss of his or 
her job due to possible retaliation.[72] The Court concluded that the Eleventh 
Circuit erred under the first subdivision of the first step in the analysis by failing 
to recognize that “Lane’s sworn testimony [was] speech as a citizen.”[73]  
 
b. The Matter of Public Concern Issue 
 
The Court then turned to the second subdivision of the first step, i.e., the issue of 
whether “Lane’s testimony is also speech on a matter of public concern.”[74]  Given 
the nature of the case in which Lane testified, the Court had little trouble resolving 
the public concern issue in Lane’s favor.[75]  




The Court first laid out the well-settled standard for determining whether speech 
was on a matter of public concern, i.e., whether the speech could be “fairly 
considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the 
community, or when it is [on] a subject of legitimate news interest,”[76] the 
resolution of which inquiry turned on the “‘content, form and context’ of the 
speech.”[77]  
 
As to the content of Lane’s testimony, the Court easily concluded that Lane’s 
testimony about “corruption in a public program and misuse of state 
fundsobviously involves a matter of significant public concern.”[78] As to the 
form and context of Lane’s speech, the Court stated that the fact that the speech 
occurred as “sworn testimony in a judicial proceeding,” bolstered its conclusion 
that the speech involved a matter of public concern.[79] Specifically, the Court 
opined that “‘[u]nlike speech in other contexts, testimony under oath has the 
formality and gravity necessary to remind the witness that his or her statements 
will be the basis for official governmental action, action that often affects the rights 
and liberties of others.’”[80] Based on this reasoning, the Court held that “Lane’s 
truthful sworn testimony at Schmitz’[s] criminal trials [constituted] speech . . . on 
a matter of public concern.”[81]  
 
c. Pickering Balancing 
 
If the Court had little difficulty resolving the public concern issue, it had the same 
or less level of trouble disposing of the second step inquiry in public employee 
cases—the Pickering balancing issue.[82]  
 
The Court started its analysis of the second step by reiterating the governing legal 
standard which it had stated or alluded to at the outset of its opinion.[83]  Thus, 
the Court repeated that, “[u]nder Pickering, if an employee speaks as a citizen on 
a matter of public concern, the next question is whether the government had ‘an 
adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any other member 
of the public’ based on the government’s needs [as] an employer.”[84]  The Court 
then delineated the government’s interest under Pickering, pointing out that 
“government employers often have legitimate interest[s] in the effective and 
efficient fulfillment of [their] responsibilities to the public, including promot[ing] 
efficiency and integrity in the discharge of official duties, and maintain[ing] proper 
discipline in public service.”[85]  
 
Applying these standards, the Court found the government employer’s proof 
completely wanting, thus concluding that the Eleventh Circuit had erred: 
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[T]he employer’s side of the Pickering scale is entirely empty: Respondents do not assert, 
and cannot demonstrate, any government interest that tips the balance in their favor.  
There is no evidence, for example that Lane’s testimony at Schmitz’[s] trials was false or 
erroneous or that Lane unnecessarily disclosed any sensitive, confidential, or privileged 
information while testifying.  In these circumstances, we conclude that Lane’s speech is 




As discussed previously, the Court, having ruled that Lane’s testimony constituted 
protected speech as a citizen under the First Amendment, also found and 
concluded that Franks was entitled to qualified immunity on Lane’s claims against 
him in his individual capacity, and remanded the case for further proceedings so 
that the lower courts could address Lane’s claims against Franks’ successor 
Burrow.[87]  
 
 The Concurring Opinion 
 
Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Scalia and Alito, wrote a brief concurring 
opinion.[88] The concurring justices noted that the “discrete question” presented 
for decision by the Court was “whether a public employee speaks ‘as a citizen on a 
matter of public concern,’ when the employee gives ‘[t]ruthful testimony under 
oath . . . outside the scope of his ordinary job duties.’”[89] According to the 
concurring opinion: 
 
Answering that question requires little more than a straightforward application of 
Garcetti. . . .The petitioner in this case did not speak “pursuant to” his ordinary job duties 
because his responsibilities did not include testifying in court proceedings . . . and no 
party has suggested that he was subpoenaed as a representative of his employer. Because 
petitioner did not testify to “fulfil[l] a [work] responsibility,” . . . he spoke “as a citizen,” 
not as an employee.[90]  
 
Like the majority opinion, the concurring justices delineated the questions that 
were not beforeand, therefore, not decided bythe Court, stating as follows: 
 
We . . . have no occasion to address the quite different question whether a public employee 
speaks “as a citizen” when he testifies in the course of his ordinary job responsibilities.  
For some public employees—such as police officers, crime scene technicians, and 
laboratory analysts—testifying is a routine and critical part of their employment duties.  
Others may be called to testify in the context of particular litigation as the designated 
representatives of their employers. The Court properly leaves the constitutional questions 
raised by these scenarios for another day.[91]  




III. THE UNANSWERED (AND RELATED) QUESTIONS   
    AFTER LANE V. FRANKS 
 
A. The Significance, if any, of the Lane Court’s Use of the Term 
“Ordinary Job Responsibilities,” Rather than the Garcetti Court’s 
“Official Duties” Terminology 
 
The first question raised by the Lane opinion is a textual one.  It stems from the 
Supreme Court’s shift from the term “official duties,” used in Garcetti to the term 
“ordinary job responsibilities,” used in Lane to define the exception to First 
Amendment protection for speech, to use Garcetti’s phrase, “ow[ing] its existence 
to a public employee’s professional responsibilities.”[92]  
 
In Garcetti, the Court majority used the term “official duties” to demarcate speech 
by public employees that would go unprotected under the First Amendment, and 
never once used the term “ordinary job responsibilities.”[93]  In contrast, the Lane 
majority and concurrence used the term “ordinary” as it pertained to job 
responsibilities or duties nine times.[94] Neither the Lane majority nor 
concurrence commented on the change in verbiage, let alone explained whether 
the Court’s shift in language was intended as a shift in meaning. 
 
It is, of course, possible that the Court’s use of the term “ordinary job 
responsibilities” in Lane was inadvertent and not intended to change the line 
drawn between protected and unprotected public employee speech by the Garcetti 
Court’s use of the term “official duties.”[95] This view would be supported by the 
similarity of the two terms and the fact that neither the Lane majority nor 
concurrence commented upon the change in language. However, this 
interpretation would run contrary to the axiom that a court’s change in language 
concerning the governing legal standard signals an intent to change the meaning 
of the legal standard.[96]  
 
More likely, in shifting from the term “official duties” in Garcetti to “ordinary job 
responsibilities” in Lane, the Court intended to say something about the line 
demarcating protected and unprotected speech as it pertains to the employee’s role 
in the workplace.  Certainly, a strong argument can be made that the Court’s “use 
of the adjective ‘ordinary’. . . could signal a narrowing of the realm of employee 
speech left unprotected by Garcetti.”[97]  However, focusing more on the Eleventh 
Circuit decision it was reversing, the Lane Court may have used the term 
“ordinary” less to signal a narrowing in meaning from what it had said in Garcetti, 
and more to clarify for lower courts that Garcetti’s “official duties” requirement 
should be read narrowly.[98] The Third Circuit, without resolving the issue, has 
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stated without explanation that “Lane may broaden Garcetti’s holding by 
including ‘ordinary’ as a modifier to the scope of an employee’s job duties”[99] 
although that judicial assertion seems clearly wrong and could only possibly be 
correct if the Supreme Court intended to broaden Garcetti by replacing, rather 
than modifying, the term “official” with the term “ordinary.” 
 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court did not define or comment upon its use of the term 
“ordinary job responsibilities” in Lane.  Likewise, the Court did not address the 
meaning of the new term in its next public employee speech case.[100] Lower 
courts have been able to avoid the definitional issue by concluding that the speech 
in the case before them fell within the meaning of both the Garcetti and Lane 
terminology, or instead, ruled in favor of a public official on qualified immunity 
grounds.[101]  For these reasons, there is no definitive judicial guidance on the 
subject. 
 
Because the Supreme Court gave no explanation for its shift in language from 
Garcetti’s “official duties” standard to Lane’s “ordinary job responsibilities” test, 
accurately predicting the threshold standard that the Court will usea standard 
based on the roles and duties of the affected public employeeto limit public 
employee speech rights, is extremely problematic.  However, several guiding 
principles may be articulated.  First, to the extent that the Court continues to limit 
those speech rights with a Garcetti-type barrier, it is likely that the Court will adopt 
one standard.  Given that the Court predicated its decision in Garcetti on a bright 
line distinction between unprotected public employee speech and protected citizen 
speech, it would make little sense to draw that line based on the official duties of 
the employee in cases when the employee is not testifying under oath, and on the 
ordinary job responsibilities of that same public employee when judicial or 
administrative testimony is involved.  Second, based on the general principle that 
exceptions to First Amendment protections should be narrowly construed,[102]   
and on the substantive principle initially advanced in Pickering and resurrected in 
Lane that public employees serve an important role as a source of information 
about the operation of public entities, the Court should adopt and apply the 
phraseology that make the least incursion on public employee speech rights.  
Third, based on a textual reading of the two phrases, Lane’s “ordinary job 
responsibilities”and particularly the term “ordinary”formulation leaves less 
public employee speech unprotected than Garcetti’s “official duties” formulation. 
 
For these reasons, as long as the Court continues to carve out an exception to public 
employee First Amendment protection premised on the scope of the employee’s 




job duties, it should apply Lane’s narrower ordinary job responsibilities standard 
to public employee speech cases. 
 
B. Testimony as Part of a Public Employee’s Ordinary Job 
Responsibilities/Official Duties 
 
As of this writing, there have not been any post-Lane cases discussing the question 
expressly left open by both the majority and concurrence in Lane, i.e., whether a 
public employee speaks as a citizenand cannot be retaliated against by a public 
employerwhen he or she provides truthful sworn testimony as part of his or her 
ordinary job responsibilities[103] or, as specifically anticipated by the 
concurrence, as a result of being designated as a witness by the employer under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6).[104]  In other words, no post-Lane cases 
have addressed the issue of whether truthful testimony by public employees which 
occurs as a result of their ordinary job responsibilities constitutes an exception to 
Garcetti’s official duties threshold limitation.[105]     
 
However, several cases decided prior to Lane, but after Garcetti, reached divergent 
results.  Indeed, prior to the Supreme Court leaving the “ordinary job 
responsibilities/truthful testimony” question unanswered in Lane, the appellate 
courts were essentially evenly split on the issue. Thus, the Third Circuit in Reilly v. 
Atlantic City,[106] had held “that truthful testimony in court” by a public employee 
“constituted citizen speech” protected under the First Amendment “not foreclosed 
by the ‘official duties’ doctrine enunciated in Garcetti.”[107]  In contrast, the Ninth 
Circuit in Huppert v. City of Pittsburg,[108]  and the Seventh Circuit in Tamayo 
v. Blagojevich,[109]  both held that testimony by a public employee given as part 
of their official duties was employee, not citizen, speech and, therefore, not 
protected under Garcetti.[110]     
 
Based largely on the Supreme Court’s decision in Lane and on its reliance on 
Pickering, the Supreme Court and post-Lane lower courts should carve out an 
exception to Garcetti’s threshold limitation by protecting truthful testimony 
given as part of a public employee’s ordinary job responsibilities.  Several reasons 
support this proposed outcome. 
 
First, the added factor of sworn testimony in judicial or administrative proceedings 
meaningfully and substantively distinguishes the question left unanswered in Lane 
from the public employee speech in Garcettian unsworn internal 
memorandumand indeed, all other public employee speech cases not involving 
testimony before a tribunal.  Sworn testimony is different.  As quoted previously, 
but worth repeating, the Lane Court emphasized: 
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Sworn testimony in judicial proceedings is a quintessential example of speech as a citizen 
for a simple reason: Anyone who testifies in court bears an obligation, to the court and 
society at large, to tell the truth.  When the person testifying is a public employee, he may 
bear separate obligations to his employer. . . . But any such obligations as an employee 
are distinct and independent from the obligation, as a citizen, to speak the truth.  That 
independent obligation renders sworn testimony speech as a citizen and sets it apart from 
speech made purely in the capacity of an employee.[111]   
 
Related, the duty to provide truthful sworn testimony raises the quasi-Catch-
22/Hobson’s choice dilemma for public employees pointed out by the Court in 
Lane.[112]  Thus, as Justice Sotomayor wrote for the Court in Lane, a rule 
 
conclud[ing] that the very kind of speech necessary to prosecute corruption by public 
officials -- speech by public employees regarding information learned through their 
employment may never form the basis of a First Amendment retaliation claim. . . . Such a 
rule would place public employees who witness corruption in an impossible position, torn 
between the obligation to testify truthfully and the desire to avoid retaliation and keep 
their jobs.[113]   
 
This dilemma will exist whether a public employee is testifying as part of his or her 
ordinary job responsibilities or, specifically, as a Rule 30(b)(6) designee of his 
employer or not.[114]  Moreover, whichever choice a public employee makes will 
be detrimental to both the employee and society at large.  If the employee testifies 
falsely or less than candidly, the employee may face perjury charges or, at the very 
least, the opprobrium and scorn of the court and anyone who observes or learns of 
his or her testimony.  Likewise, as pointed out by the Court in Lane and Pickering, 
false testimony will deprive society (and the judge, jury and parties before the 
court) of valuable, accurate information from a public employee who may be 
ideally or uniquely suited to provide the testimony.  If, however, the employee 
testifies truthfully, without the security of First Amendment protection, he or she 
runs the risk of being retaliated against by his employer.  Although society (and the 
above-mentioned stakeholders) will initially receive the benefit of the Pickering-
promoted information, society (and future judicial or administrative tribunal 
stakeholders) will ultimately be disserved as public employees chill their own 
speech and/or censor themselves because of the very real specter of adverse 
employment consequences. 
 
In addition, much like in Lane, the individual speaker’s and society’s interest in 
truthful sworn testimony given by public employees as part of their ordinary job 
responsibilities will seldom be outweighed by public employers’ interest in 
managerial efficiency or control under Pickering. In what should be relatively rare 
instances, the importance of truthful testimony and its role in maintaining the 




integrity of the judicial or administrative process and promoting public awareness 
about matters of public concern may be sufficiently counterbalanced by a public 
employer’s (and society’s) legitimate interest in maintaining confidentiality 
concerning an ongoing investigation by law enforcement,[115] or a matter of 
national security.[116]   And, in those relatively rare circumstances, the court itself 
will have the ability to protect the public employer’s interest by determining, prior 
to the testimony, whether the evidence is admissible or, specific to the issue before 
it, determining whether the government’s interest in confidentiality outweighs the 
public employee’s interest as a citizen, and society’s interest in having the 
employee testify truthfully about a matter of public concern.[117] Thus, to borrow 
from Lane, when a public employee testifies truthfully as part of his or her ordinary 
job responsibilities, “the employer’s side of the Pickering scale” will almost always 
be “entirely empty.”[118]  
 
In conclusion, courts should carve out an exception to Garcettitempered only 
rarely by Pickering balancingby protecting public employees from retaliation 
and adverse employment consequences when they testify truthfully about a matter 
of public concern as part of their ordinary job responsibilities. 
 
 
C. Voluntary/Non-Compelled Testimony 
 
As with the “ordinary job responsibilities/truthful sworn testimony” question, few, 
if any, post-Lane cases have discussed whether voluntary testimony should enjoy 
the same First Amendment protection as compelled, i.e., subpoenaed, 
testimony.[119] As with a number of the Lane’s unanswered questions, guidance 
can be found in pre-Lane authorities.   
 
 Protection of Voluntary Testimony as a Threshold Matter 
 
Pre-Lane, several courts in the Second Circuit concluded that voluntary testimony 
should receive constitutional protection, succinctly stating that “[v]oluntarily 
appearing as a witness in a public proceeding or a lawsuit is a kind of speech that 
is protected by the First Amendment.”[120] In addition, the Third Circuit, 
presaging the Lane Court’s view that the need to protect uninhibited testimony 
and, in turn, the integrity of the judicial process is paramount, held that witnesses 
who appear voluntarily to testify in judicial proceedings must be free from 
employer retaliation under the First Amendment.[121] Only one panel in the 
Second Circuit, in an unpublished decision, held prior to Lane that voluntary 
testimony is not protected under the First Amendment.[122]  
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In sum, the vast majority of federal circuit court decisions pre-Lane agreed that, 
as a threshold matter, truthful voluntary testimony on a matter of public concern 
should be protected under the First Amendment. 
 
 Voluntary Testimony and Pickering Balancing 
 
As noted above, although essentially all pre-Lane courts have concluded, as a 
threshold matter, that voluntary sworn testimony is entitled to First Amendment 
protection, those same courts have also evaluated, consistent with Lane, the 
several interests raised by the Pickering-balancing test.[123] Interestingly, those 
courts reached divergent results.  Thus, in Green, the Third Circuit, discounting 
the public’s interest in truthful testimony when voluntary, not subpoenaed, 
testimony is involved and focusing on the “potential disruptiveness of the speech” 
– which involved testimony in favor of a member of a crime family member – on 
law enforcement departmental morale, held that the “risk of injury to the . . . Police 
Department outweighs the public interest favoring Green’s speech.”[124]   
However, in Kinney v. Weaver, the Fifth Circuit came to the opposite conclusion, 
holding – in a case involving testimony by two police officers adverse to their 
employer’s interest in an excessive force case – that the public’s interest in expert 
testimony about police misconduct and the existence of a factual dispute regarding 
whether police department officials could reasonably predict workplace disruption  
due to the officers’ testimony precluded summary judgment in favor of the public 
officials under Pickering.[125]         
 
Based on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Lane, there can be little legitimate 
dispute that the majority of pre-Lane courts got it right: whether testimony is 
voluntary or pursuant to a subpoena, two important purposes would be served by 
placing all truthful sworn testimony by a public employee pertaining to a matter of 
public concern within the ambit of the First Amendment’s protection against 
retaliation.  First, as made clear by the Third Circuit in Green and by the high Court 
in Lane, the integrity of the judicial processand, specifically, the pursuit of truth 
in criminal and civil casesremains a paramount societal goal irrespective of 
whether a witness’s testimony is compelled by subpoena or voluntary. Second, as 
resurrected by the Court in Lane and stressed in this Article, the ability of public 
employees to serve as sources of information about corruption and other matters 
of public concern is wholly unrelated to whether they testify voluntarily or are 
compelled to testify via subpoena and cannot be gainsaid. Both of these important 
purposes would be disserved if public employers were allowed to retaliate against 
public employees who provide truthful sworn testimony under the happenstance 
that their testimony was voluntary, rather than compelled via subpoena.[126]   
Thus, all truthful sworn testimony by public employeesand not just testimony 




compelled by subpoenaregarding matters of public concern should generally be 
protected under the First Amendment. 
 
However, as most appellate courts have opined, protection of voluntary truthful 
sworn testimony should be subject to a Pickering-balancing analysis.[127]   Given 
the importance of truthful sworn testimony, the Third Circuit in Green,[128]  as a 
practical matter, made too much of the difference in the public’s interest in 
compelled, as opposed to voluntary testimony. After all, for First Amendment 
purposes, the public’s interest in sworn testimony depends, not on whether the 
testimony is compelled, but rather, whether the testimony is inaccurate or 
perjured.  That said, a public employer’s interest in effectively and efficiently 
delivering the public services concerning which it has been tasked cannot be 
ignored.  As pointed out in Green and other cases which have struck the balance 
against protecting public employees from adverse employment consequences 
based on their voluntary testimony, issues of confidentiality, chain of command, 
employee discipline and employer image[129]particularly in law enforcement, 
but also for other public employersare appropriately factored into the mix when 
assessing a public employee’s right to First Amendment protection for testifying 
on a matter of public concern.  Ultimately, though, as in Kinney and other public 
employee-favoring cases,[130] the Pickering-balance should only cede to public 
employers when the incursion on their efficiency and effectiveness is grounded in 
reasonable, factually-supported prediction or actuality of disruption to the 
operation of public employers. 
 
D. Testimony Whose Content Does Not Involve a Matter of Public 
Concern 
 
The Lane Court had little difficulty concluding that both the content and context 
of Lane’s speechtruthful testimony at several judicial proceedings concerning 
corruption in a state program and misuse of state funds—involved a matter of 
public concern protected by the First Amendment under the Pickering/Connick 
standard.[131] However, courts of appeals and district courtsboth before and 
after Lanehave been sharply divided over whether trial testimony, irrespective 
of the content of the testimony, constitutes a matter of public concern protectable 
under the First Amendment. 
 
Prior to Lane, the Third and Fifth Circuits took the most expansive view regarding 
the question, holding that the sworn form and judicial or formalized context of 
testimony made it per se a matter of public concern, even where the content of the 
speech involves a purely private  matter.[132]  At the other end of the spectrum, 
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the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits held that sworn testimony in a 
judicial or other proceeding will only constitute a matter of public concern where 
the content of the speech addresses a matter of public concern (such as a political, 
social or other concern to the community).[133]  And, between these two doctrinal 
poles, the Ninth Circuit has held: 
 
[A] public employee’s testimony addresses a matter of public concern if it contributes in 
some way to the resolution of a judicial or administrative proceeding in which 
discrimination or other significant government misconduct is at issue—even if the speech 
itself would not otherwise meet the Connick test were we to consider it in isolation.[134]    
 
The post-Lane judicial results concerning the testimony/public concern standard 
have been equally mixed. One court, although dismissing a public employee’s First 
Amendment retaliation claims on other grounds, cited to Third Circuit per se 
authority and that portion of the Supreme Court’s holding in Lane focusing on the 
judicial context, agreed that the employee’s participation in several law suits 
constituted protected speech.[135] Other post-Lane courts, however, have 
continued to reject the per se standard and have continued to hold that content 
matters.[136]  Lastly, as it did pre-Lane, the Ninth Circuit has arguably continued 
to apply a middle ground test post-Lane, citing to and quoting its Alpha Energy 
decision to the effect that “a public employee’s testimony addresses a matter of 
public concern if it contributes in some way to the resolution of a judicial or 
administrative proceeding in which discrimination or other significant 
government misconduct is at issue.”[137]    
 
Whether public employee testimony whose content does not involve a matter of 
public concern should be protected because of the context in which the speech 
occurs raises the most difficult unanswered question in Lane.  As discussed 
previously, Lane emphasized two reasons for protecting public employees from 
retaliation for testifying truthfully: first, to protect and promote the truth-seeking 
function of the judicial and administrative processes;[138]  and second, to ensure 
that the public at large has a source of information concerning the operation of a 
public employerand, specifically, issues of corruption and other matters of 
public concernthat may on occasion only be provided by public employees.[139]    
The first purpose relates to context, and the second purpose relates to 
content.[140] In Lane, where the public employee testimony concerned corruption 
in the public sector workplace,[141]  both purposes were served.  However, in cases 
where the content of the public employee’s testimony does not involve a matter of 
public concernsuch as Johnston, where the testimony related to a personnel 
issue involving the public employer, and, in Pro, where the plaintiff appeared in a 
case, a divorce proceeding, that did not involve the employer’s operations, let alone 




corruption or wrongdoing in the public sector workplace[142] only the purpose 
of promoting truthful testimony would be served. 
 
The question then becomes whether service of this latter purpose is sufficient to 
protect public employees from retaliation by public employers under the First 
Amendment.  The answer must be that it does.  Stakeholders to judicial and 
administrative proceedingsthe public at large, the courts and tribunals, and the 
parties to the proceedingsare entitled to truthful testimony in furtherance of the 
fact-finding and truth-seeking goals of those proceedings.  Likewise, public 
employees, irrespective of whether their testimony involves a matter of public 
concern about the operation of their employers, should not be placed in the 
“impossible position” described by the Court in Lane,[143]  i.e., testify falsely and 
commit perjury or testify truthfully and lose their job.  For these reasons, context 
alone under the per se rule described in pre- and post-Lane cases should be 
sufficient to cause truthful testimony to be protected under the First Amendment. 
 
E. False or Erroneous Testimony or Unnecessary Disclosure of 
Sensitive, Confidential or Privileged Information 
 
The Lane Court suggested in dicta that the outcome of the case might have been 
different under the Pickering-balancing test if “Lane’s testimony at Schmitz’[s] 
trials was false or erroneous or that Lane unnecessarily disclosed any sensitive, 
confidential, or privileged information while testifying.”[144]  No post-Lane cases 
have discussed Lane concerning the resolution of these two issues; however, pre-
Lane case law and at least one case decided after Lane but not discussing it, have 
all properly reached the conclusion that public employee testimony falling into 
these two categories would not be protected when assessed under Pickering. 
 
 False or Erroneous Testimony 
 
Although the Supreme Court has not resolved whether false statements made 
outside of court may constitute protected speech under the First Amendment and 
lower courts are divided on the issue,[145]   pre-Lane lower courts held that public 
employees who testify falsely in a judicial proceedings were not entitled to First 
Amendment protection from discharge by public employers.[146] Indeed, 
applying the Supreme Court’s decision in Waters v. Churchill,[147] lower courts 
prior to Lane held that, where a public employer reasonably, but mistakenly, 
believes that a public employee testified falsely, the employer may fire the 
employee without offending the First Amendment.[148] Courts largely based these 
later decisions concerning false testimony by applying Pickering, increasing the 
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weight allocated to the public employer’s interest and reducing the weight 
allocated to the public employee’s interest on the Pickering scales: 
 
[I]f an employee has presented false testimony both sides of the Pickering balance may 
be significantly altered.  As the First Circuit has recognized, “an employer has a greater 
interest in curtailing erroneous statements than correct ones, and still a greater interest 
in curtailing deliberate falsehoods,” and “[c]orrespondingly, an employee’s interest in 
making public statements is heightened according to their veracity.”[149]    
 
Unlike in Lane, where truthful sworn testimony was properly viewed as critical to 
both the integrity of the judicial process and society’s interest in protecting sources 
of information about matters of public concern,[150]  and was subject to essentially 
no counterbalancing on the public employer’s side of the Pickering scales, false or 
erroneous testimony by a public employee should be allocated essentially no 
weighteither absolutely or in the Pickering-balancing process. False or 
erroneous testimony debases the judicial truth-seeking process.  Likewise, that 
same testimony does not furtherand, indeed, may underminesociety’s interest 
in learning about and ferreting out corruption in the government workplace.  For 
these reasons, false or erroneous testimony should not protect a public employee 
from retaliation under the First Amendment. 
 
 Unnecessary Disclosure of Sensitive, Confidential or Privileged 
Information 
 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Lane, lower courts applied Pickering to 
routinely reject First Amendment retaliation claims by public employees seeking 
to challenge discharge or other adverse employment action based on the 
employees’ having disclosedalbeit not while testifyingconfidential or sensitive 
information held by the public employer.[151]   Pre-Lane decisions concerning the 
same question in the context of employer retaliation in response to sworn 
testimony in judicial proceedings are scarce or nonexistentalthough one court 
has suggested that a police bureau’s pre-authorization requirement for officers 
wishing to serve as an expert witness might have been saved from First 
Amendment infirmity if it had been narrowly tailored to protect a municipality’s 
legitimate interest in preventing disclosure of confidential information.[152]   
Post-Lane decisions have similarly rejected First Amendment retaliation claims by 
public employees who disclosed public employer confidential information in 
settings outside of testifying in court.[153]     
 
The government, acting as a public employer, will occasionally have a legitimate 
interest in preventing a public employee from testifying truthfully about a matter 




of public concern that will outweigh the employee, the judicial system, and 
society’s interest in obtaining truthful testimony from that employee.  As discussed 
previously, this interest may arise where the government has legitimate 
reasonsincluding not compromising the confidentiality of an ongoing operation, 
maintaining the safety of public officials and employees, or not otherwise 
disrupting sensitive government operationsfor objecting to public disclosure of 
law enforcement or national security investigations or operations.[154]   As such, 
disclosure by public employees of confidential information,[155] although often 
preventable by the government by appearing at the proceedings at which the public 
employee will testify and objecting to the employee’s testimony regarding 
legitimately confidential subjects, may properly cause a public employee to lose 
under the Pickering-balancing test.  Under those circumstances, and as discussed 
below,[156]   that legitimate interest will provide an employer with cause for taking 
adverse employment action against the employee. 
 
F. Public Employee Admission of Wrongdoing While Testifying 
 
Toward the close of its opinion, the Lane Court noted that “quite apart from 
Pickering balancing, wrongdoing that an employee admits to while testifying may 
be a valid basis for termination or other discipline.”[157]  Post-Lane, two district 
courts have applied the above-quoted “wrongdoing” language, but concluded that 
sufficient factual issues existed in each case such that pre-trial motions by public 
sector employees could not be granted.[158]   
 
Lane’s “wrongdoing” dicta stems from two, related legal principles. First, it stands 
for the proposition that, generally speaking, misconduct by a public employee may 
give his or her employer just or good cause to take adverse employment against the 
employee.[159]  Second, it may relate to the Supreme Court’s causation analysis in 
First Amendment retaliation cases set forth in Mount Healthy City School District 
Board of Education. v. Doyle,[160] where the Court held that, even if a public 
employee has demonstrated that his or her protected speech was a substantial or 
motivating factor in his or her termination, a public employer may still avoid 
liability by showing by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have 
terminated the employee even in the absence of the protected speech.[161] 
However, even if a public employer sustains its evidentiary burden on the 
causation issue, a public employee’s admission during testimony that he or she 
engaged in wrongdoingparticularly when it involves relatively innocuous, albeit 
criminal, off-duty conduct or speechshould not lead to adverse employment 
action against the employee in every instance.[162]  Likewise, a public employer 
must adhere to any applicable progressive discipline and/or due process 
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requirements when disciplining or discharging a public employee who admits to 
wrongdoing while testifying.[163] And, if a public employee has reached an 
agreement with his or her employer that the employee’s testimony about the 
misconduct will not cause him or her adverse employment consequence, then the 
public employer must honor that agreement.[164]   
 
Certainly, if a public employee admits while testifying that he or she engaged in 
wrongdoing, and the employee has not received any kind of promise from his or 
her employer that the testimony will not be used against his or her continued 
employment, that admission may serve as a basis for the public employer to take 
adverse employment action against the employee. However, that general 
proposition must be limited by principles of causation, nexus of the misconduct to 
employment, and progressive discipline and/or due process. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
The Supreme Court left unanswered far more questions than it resolved in Lane v. 
Franks.  The Court, however, by resurrecting and reemphasizing first principles 
from Pickering—that public employees should be protected under the First 
Amendment from retaliation by their employers because the employees are often 
uniquely situated to report on corruption and other matters of public concern in 
the public sector workplace—provided the compass by which courts should 
navigate the difficult terrain posed by those open questions in the sworn testimony 
context.  The Court and lower courts should take guidance from Pickering’s 
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integrity of the judicial process.”  Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 444 (2006) (Souter, J., 
dissenting).   
[44] Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2377.  In framing the question in this manner, the Supreme Court did 
not accept the Eleventh Circuit’s premise that Lane’s speech was undertaken within the scope of 
his broadly defined official duties. 
[45] Lane, 134 S. Ct. 2383. 
[46] See id. at 2374.  
[47] Id. 
[48] 391 U.S. 563; Lane, 134 S. Ct at 2374 (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968)).  
In Pickering, the Court held that a school board violated the First Amendment rights of a public 
school teacher by firing him after he wrote a letter to the school board criticizing the board and 
superintendent’s handling of school financing and revenue matters.  391 U.S. at 564-65. 
[49] Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2374 (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568) (alteration in original).  
[50] Id. at 2374-75.  
[51] 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
[52] See Rodric B. Schoen, Pickering Plus Thirty Years: Public Employees and Free Speech, 30 
TEX. TECH. L. REV. 5, 18 (1999) (“Connick teaches that in future public employee-free speech 
cases, the threshold judicial issue is whether the speech resulting in termination pertains to a 
matter of public concern.”); see also Martha M. McCarthy & Suzanne E. Eckes, Silence in the 
Hallways: the Impact of Garcetti v. Ceballos on Public School Educators, 17 B.U. PUB. INT. L. J. 
209, 218 (2008) (“The Supreme Court in Garcetti establishes a new threshold question courts 
must ask when determining whether a public employee’s expression will be subject to the 
Pickering balancing test.”). 
[53] See Connick, 461 U.S. at 143 (agreeing with prosecutor Connick that, with one exception, 
“no balancing of interests is required in this case because Myers’ questionnaire concerned only 
internal office matters and that such speech is not upon a matter of ‘public concern,’ as the term 
was used in Pickering,”); id. (stating that “Pickering, its antecedents, and its progeny, lead us to 
conclude that if Myers’ questionnaire cannot be fairly characterized as constituting speech on a 
matter of public concern, it is unnecessary for us to scrutinize the reasons for her discharge.”).  
[54] See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 414-15 (2006). 
[55]  Id. at 424. 
[56] Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2378 (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418). 
[57] Id. (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421).  
[58] Id. at 2378 n.4 (citations omitted).  
[59] See Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2378. 
[60] Id. at 2378. 
[61] Id. at 2378-79. 
[62] Id.  
[63] Id. at 2379 (citations omitted). 
[64] See id.  
[65] Id.  
[66]  Id. 
[67]  Id. 
[68]  Id. (alteration in original) (citing and quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 
(2006)).  
[69]  Id. at 2379. 




[70]  Id. at 2379-80 (citations omitted) The Court further stated, “[P]ublic employees ‘are 
uniquely qualified to comment’ on ‘matters concerning government policies that are of interest 
to the public at large.’”Id. at 2380. 
[71] See id. at 2380.  Of course, Garcetti involved possible corruption by law enforcement officers 
learned by a prosecutor during the course of his work, i.e., during the performance of his official duties.  
Thus, the very anomaly that the Lane Court decried had already occurred in Garcetti. See id.; see also 
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 410. 
[72] See Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2380. 
[73] See id. 
[74] Id. 
[75] See id. (“Applying these principles, it is clear that Lane’s sworn testimony is speech as a 
citizen.”). 
[76] Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).  
[77] Id. (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48 (1983)). 
[78] Id. (citing and quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425 (2006)) (“Exposing governmental 
inefficiency and misconduct is a matter of considerable significance.”).  
[79] See id. 
[80] Id. (quoting United States v. Alvarez,  132 S. Ct. 2537, 2546 (2012) (plurality opinion)). 
[81] Id. at 2380. 
[82] See id. at 2373-77. 
[83] See id. at 2377. 
[84] Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2380 (quoting and citing Garcetti, 547 U.S. at418 (2006)). 
[85] Id. at 2381 (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting and citing 
Connick, 461 U.S. at 150-51 (1983)). 
[86] Id. at 2381. The Court also noted that “quite apart from Pickering balancing, wrongdoing 
that an employee admits to while testifying may be a valid basis for termination or other 
discipline.” Id. at 2381 n.5; see infra note 157 and accompanying text. 
[87] See Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2376-77.  Although Lane was the proverbial “easy case” as far as 
Supreme Court cases go, the Court held that Franks was entitled to qualified immunity because 
Lane’s First Amendment rights were not clearly established, and the question concerning those 
rights were not “beyond debate” at the time Franks terminated Lane’s employment. Id. at 2376, 
2383.  
[88] Id. at 2383-84. 
[89] Id. at 2383 (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418); see also id. at 2374, 2378; Connick, 461 U.S. 
at 143; cf. supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
[90] Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2384 (alterations in original) (citations omitted). 
[91] Id. (citations omitted). 
[92] See id.; see also Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.  
[93] Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421. In his Garcetti dissent, Justice Breyer twice used the term 
“ordinary” as it pertained to job duties.  Id. at 444, 449-50.  
[94]  Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2375, 2377-79, 2381, 2383-84; see also Mpoy v. Rhee, 758 F.3d 285, 294-95 
(D.C. Cir. 2014).   
[95] See Trustees v. Sons, 27 Ill. 2d 63, 66, 187 N.E.2d 673, 674 (1963) (opining that where 
change in statutory language occurred inadvertently, legislature did not intend to change 
meaning of statute). 
[96] See, e.g., Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 974 n.14 (11th Cir. 2008) (where the Supreme 
Court used different language in a Title VII retaliation case than in a Title VII discrimination 
case, the legal standard in each case was held to be different); State v. Parks, 866 So.2d 172, 174 
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(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (“[W]hen the legislature amends a statute by omitting or including 
words, it is to be presumed that the legislature intended the statute to have a different meaning 
than that accorded it before the amendment.”); United States v. Brewer, 9 M.J. 509, 512 (A.F. 
Ct. M. R. 1980) (where a court used different language than previously, new terminology would 
be held to change the legal standard).  
[97] See Dibrito v. City of St. Joseph, 675 F. App’x 593, 596(6th Cir.  2017); Mpoy, 758 F.3d at 
295; Lynch v. Ackley, 811 F.3d 569, 582 n.13 (2d Cir. 2016); , 804 F.3d 1149, 1163 (11th Cir. 
2015); Boulton v. Swanson, 795 F.3d 526, 534 (6th Cir. 2015); Gibson v. Kirkpatrick, 773 F.3d 
661, 668 (5th Cir. 2014); see also Hagan v. City of New York, 39 F. Supp. 3d 481, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 
2014) (emphasis in original) (“[T]he question is not whether an employee’s speech is made 
pursuant to any official duty, but whether it is made pursuant to one of his ordinary official 
duties.”); but cf. Brown v. Office of State Comptroller, 211 F. Supp. 3d 455, 464 n.3 (D. Conn. 
2016) (Hagan’s “interpretation of Lane is too broad.”).   
[98] See Flora v. Cty. of Luzerne, 776 F.3d 169, 179 (3d Cir. 2015) (declining to reach the 
question of “whether Lane modified or merely clarified Garcetti” in terms of the official duties 
standard. 
[99] Dougherty v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 772 F.3d 979, 990 (3d Cir. 2014) (emphasis 
added). Inexplicably, the Third Circuit quotes the D.C. Circuit’s above-quoted statement in Mpoy 
concerning Lane’s narrowing the Garcetti official duties standard as support for its statement in 
Dougherty.  Flora, 776 F.3d at 178 (quoting Mpoy, 758 F.3d at 294-95). 
[100] See Heffernan v. City of Patterson, 136 S. Ct. 1412, 1414 (2016) (holding that fact that 
supervisor’s mistaken that the employee was involved in the mayoral campaign was mistaken 
did not bar a First Amendment retaliation claim by the officer).   
[101]  See Lefebrve v. Morgan, No. 14-CV-5322 (KMK), 2016 WL 1274584, at *10 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 31, 2016) (where public employee’s speech “was related to the heart of his job 
responsibilities,” any possible distinction between Garcetti and Lane standards did not affect 
the court’s analysis); Cory v. City of Basehor, 631 F. App’x. 526, 529 (10th Cir. 2015) (“Mr. Cory’s 
reports did not merely ‘concern’ his duties, but were made ‘within the scope’ of his duties as a 
police officer.”); Gibson, 773 F.3d 661 at 668-69 (not reaching the question of whether Lane 
altered Garcetti, since a “clearly established” standard for qualified immunity dictated the result 
in favor of the individual defendant); Mpoy, 758 F.3d at 295-96 (likewise not reaching the 
question after concluding defendants were entitled to qualified immunity).  
[102] See Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 408 n.24 (5th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he Supreme Court 
in recent years has made it clear that the First Amendment has a broad reach, limited only by 
narrow, traditional carve-outs from its protection.”). 
[103] See Crystal v. Barrett, No. JKB-14-3989, 2015 WL 5698534, at *7 (D. Md. Sept. 25, 2015) 
(noting that Lane left open the question of whether testimony pursuant to a public employee’s 
ordinary job responsibilities constitutes protected speech and leaving the question open itself at 
an early stage in the proceedings).  
[104] Rule 30(b)(6), Fed. R.Civ. P. provides in pertinent part: 
In its notice or subpoena, a party may name as the deponent a public or private corporation, a partnership, 
an association, a governmental agency, or other entity and must describe with reasonable particularity the 
matters for examination.  The named organization must then designate one or more officers, directors, or 
managing agents, or designate other persons who consent to testify on its behalf; and it may set out the 
matters on which each person designated will testify . . . .  The persons designated must testify about 
information known or reasonably available to the organization.  
[105]  The closest a court has come to directly addressing the question expressly left open in 
Lane was in Rayborn v. Bossier Par. Sch. Sys., 198 F. Supp. 3d 747 (W.D. La. 2016).  In Rayborn, 
a public school nurse alleged that school officials retaliated against her when, among other 




things, she turned over her notes concerning a student in response to a subpoena.  Id. at 758-59.  
Focusing on the fact that the nurse’s official duties included maintaining records concerning her 
nursing activities, the district court was “not persuaded” by the nurse’s attempt, based on the 
notes having been subpoenaed, “to analogize their constitutional status to that of the testimony 
protected in Lane.”  Id. at 759.  In rejecting the nurse’s First Amendment claim, the court was 
unclear on whether it was distinguishing her subpoenaed notes from Lane’s trial testimony or, 
instead, was deciding the open question in Lane in favor of the public employer.  Clarity 
eventually may be obtained on this issue, since, as of this writing, Rayborn is pending on appeal 
to the Fifth Circuit. 
[106] 532 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2008). 
[107]  Id. at 231. 
[108] 574 F.3d 696 (9th Cir. 2009).   
[109] 526 F.3d 1074 (7th Cir. 2008).  
[110]  Huppert, 574 F.3d at 707-08; Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1092.   
[111]  Lane, 134 S. Ct. at  2379 (citations omitted); see also supra note 89. 
[112]  See id. at 2379-80.   
[113]  Id at 2380; see supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
[114]  For this reason, and although testifying as a Rule 30(b)(6) representative of an employer 
might be considered, to paraphrase Justice Sotomayor in Lane, quintessential speech as an 
employee, the above-discussed dilemmathe importance of truthful sworn testimony to the 
judicial and administrative process and society’s need for information about matters of public 
concernall militate in favor of protecting public employees from retaliation even when their 
testimony is pursuant to a Rule 30(b)(6) designation.  
[115]  See Joseph Deloney, Note,  Protecting Public Employee Trial Testimony, 91 CHI. KENT L. 
REV. 709, 734 (2016) (“If an employee discloses confidential information, although truthful, the 
government could take action without violating that employee’s First Amendment rights.”).  
[116]  See Lemay Diaz, Comment, Truthful Testimony as the “Quintessential Example of Speech 
as a Citizen”: Why Lane v. Franks Lays the Groundwork for Protecting Public Employee 
Truthful Testimony, 46 SETON HALL L. REV. 565, 595 (2016) (“Perhaps in some rare 
circumstance, such as in the realm of national security, the government in its role as an employer 
may articulate an important government interest requiring utmost confidentiality.  And under 
such circumstances, the government employer may truly possess a strong managerial 
discretionary interest in curtailing the public employee’s speech.”). 
[117]  Deloney, supra note 115, at 719. 
[118]  Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2381. 
[119]  Two post-Lane cases have addressed voluntary, as opposed to compelled, statements, but 
neither case discussed whether voluntary testimony would receive the same First Amendment 
protection from retaliation as the subpoenaed testimony in Lane.  Neither case is on point on 
the “voluntary vs. compelled testimony” question.  See Helget v. City of Hays, No. 13-2228-KHV, 
2015 WL 1263118, at *11 (D. Kan. Mar. 19, 2015) (factual showing that a voluntary sworn affidavit 
caused the court to assume, without deciding, that plaintiff’s speech was a matter of public 
concern), aff’d on other grounds, 844 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2017); see also Wagner v. Lee Cty., 
Fla. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, No. 2:14-cv-29-FTM-38CM, 2014 WL 4145500, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 
21, 2014) (explaining that this case differs from Lane in that the statements involved voluntary 
internal statements, not judicial testimony). 
[120] Kaluczky v. City of White Plains, 57 F.3d 202, 210 (2d Cir. 1995) (citations omitted); 
accord Caruso v. City of New York, 973 F. Supp. 2d 430, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Jackler v. Byrne, 
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658 F.3d 225, 239 (2d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); Frisenda v. Inc. Vill. of Malverne, 775 F. 
Supp. 2d 486, 510 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).   
[121]  Green v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 105 F.3d 882, 886-89 (3d Cir. 1997); accord Kinney 
v. Weaver, 367 F.3d 337, 361-62, 362 n.28 (5th Cir. 2004) (expert witnesses received subpoenas, 
but testified voluntarily); see also Worrell v. Henry, 219 F.3d 1197, 1201, 1204-05 (10th Cir. 
2000) (expert witness for criminal defendant); Tedder v. Norman, 167 F.3d 1213, 1214-15 (8th 
Cir. 1999) (voluntary deposition testimony).  The Third Circuit in Green did not terminate its 
analysis by concluding that voluntary testimony was invariably protected under the First 
Amendment; rather, the court of appeals in Greenand the courts of appeals in the other cases 
cited abovewent on to analyze whether the speech was protected under the Pickering-
balancing test. See Green, 105 F.3d at 887-89; see also Kinney, 367 F.3d at 358-67; Worrell, 19 
F.3d at 1205-09; Tedder, 167 F.3d at 1214-15.  This aspect of the analysis will be taken up at Part 
III.C.2. 
[122]  Kiehle v. County of Cortland, 486 F. App’x 222, 224 (2d Cir. 2012). 
[123]  See Green, 105 F.3d at 887-89; see also Kinney, 367 F.3d at 358-67, 362 n.28; Worrell, 
219 F.3d at 1201, 1204-09; Tedder, 167 F.3d at 1214-15.     
[124]  Green, 105 F.3d at 888-89 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).  There are several 
similar decisions.  See, e.g., Tedder, 167 F.3d at 1215 (where voluntary testimony substantially 
undermined the relationship between the plaintiff and his supervisor, the supervisor reasonably 
believed that the testimony was provided in violation of agency policy, and testimony could 
disrupt the employer's relationships with other law enforcement agencies, holding the testimony 
unprotected under Pickering.); Worrell, 219 F.3d at 1208-09 (where drug agents with whom 
applicant for drug task force coordinator would have had to work with had indicated they did 
not trust applicant because he had testified for a defendant in a murder trial, the potential for 
extreme disruption of task force's functioning existed).   
[125]  Kinney, 367 F.3d at 374; accord Melton v. City of Oklahoma City, 879 F.2d 706, 714 (10th 
Cir. 1989) (finding that where a police officer voluntarily testified for a judge who was a criminal 
defendant, the public interest in truthful testimony outweighed the public entities’ interest in 
confidentiality or possible disruption under Pickering); Minten v. Weber, 832 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 
1020-24 (N.D. Iowa 2011) (holding that where a police officer offered to voluntarily testify 
against a sheriff in a civil suit brought by plaintiffs alleging that denial of their applications for 
concealed weapon permits violated their First Amendment rights, the public’s interest in 
encouraging testimony disclosing misconduct by the sheriff outweighed the police department’s 
interest in operational efficiency and harmony.); Lynch v. City of Philadelphia, 166 F. Supp. 2d 
224, 229-31 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (distinguishing Green, and where, assuming police officer 
voluntarily testified at subordinate officers’ criminal trials, plaintiff’s (and public’s) interest in 
truthful testimony was not outweighed by minimal disruption caused to police department’s 
operations).      
[126]  As pointed out by one commentator, “many witnesses are compelled by subpoena 
arbitrarily,” since “[a]ttorneys ‘issue subpoenas to witnesses who would have voluntarily 
attended even absent a subpoena.’” Deloney, supra note 115 at 732 n.207 (quoting Brief for Am. 
Civil Liberties Union & the Am. Civil Liberties Union of Alabama as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner at 13, Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369 (2014) (No. 13-483)).  Another commentator has 
pointed out that “if a subpoena is required for the testifying employee to maintain his First 
Amendment rights, the testifying employee will always refuse to testify unless subpoenaed.” 
Matt Wolfe, Comment, Does the First Amendment Protect Testimony by Public Employees?, 77 




U. CHI. L. REV. 1473, 1500 (2010).  In sum, the furtherance of important First Amendment 
purposes and protections should not turn on such arbitrary practical matters and distinctions. 
[127]  See Kinney, 367 F.3d at 382 (Jones, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also 
Green, 105 F.3d at 887. 
[128] See Green, 105 F.3d at 886, 888.   
[129]   Id. at 889-90; see also Kinney, 367 F.3d at 396-97, 398 (Jones, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
[130]    See Kinney, 367 F.3d at 367; Tedder v. Norman, 167 F.3d 1213, 1214-15 (8th Cir. 1999); 
Melton v. City of Oklahoma City, 879 F.2d 706, 714 (10th Cir. 1989). 
[131]  Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2380-81. 
[132]  See Pro v. Donatucci, 81 F.3d 1283, 1288 (3d Cir. 1996) (citations omitted); Johnston v. 
Harris Cty. Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565, 1578 (5th Cir. 1989).  
[133]  See Arvinger v. Mayor and City of Baltimore, 862 F.2d 75, 79 (4th Cir. 1988); Wright v. 
Ill.s Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 40 F.3d 1492, 1505 (7th Cir. 1994); Padilla v. South-
Harrison R-II Sch. Dist., 181 F.3d 992, 997 (8th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted); Morris v. Crow, 
142 F.3d 1379, 1382-83 (11th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). 
[134]  Alpha Energy Savers, Inc. v. Hansen, 381 F.3d 917, 927 (9th Cir. 2004).   
[135]  Falco v. Zimmer, No. 13-1648, 2015 WL 7069653, at ** 1-3 and 8 (citations omitted); see 
also Helget v. City of Hays, Kansas No. 13-2228-KHV, 2015 WL 1263118, at *11 (D. Kan. Mar. 
19, 2015) (noting pre-Lane split in the case law, but, under Lane, even though “standing in 
isolation, the content of plaintiff's speech may not have raised a matter of public concern,” 
district court assumed, but did not decide, that speech in sworn affidavit in co-worker’s civil case 
was a matter of public concern).   
[136]  Moriates v. City of New York, No. 13-CV-4845 (ENV) (LB), 2016 WL 3566656, at **1-2 
and 5 (E.D.N.Y. June 15, 2016) (citations omitted); see also Meza v. Douglas Cty. Fire Dist., No. 
2:15-CV-115-RMP, 2016 WL 3746568, at *4 (E.D. Wash. July 8, 2016) (finding that firefighter 
could not prove that his testimony in an arbitration over a coworker’s termination involved a 
matter of public concern where firefighter could not recall the specifics of his testimony).   
[137]  Stillwell v. City of Williams, 831 F.3d 1234, 1239 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Alpha Energy 
Savers Inc. v. Hansen, 381 F.3d 917, 927 (9th Cir. 2004)).     
[138]  See Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2379. 
[139] See id. at 2379-80. 
[140] See id. at 2381 (The circumstances under which the speech is uttered relates to context, 
whereas the information contained in the speech relates to its content).  
[141]   See id. at 2380-81. 
[142]   See Johnston v. Harris Cty. Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565 (5th Cir. 1989); Pro v. 
Donatucci, 81 F.3d 1283 (3d Cir. 1996).     
[143]    Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2381. 
[144]  Id. 
[145]  In Pickering, the Supreme Court stated that “we have no occasion to pass upon the 
additional question whether a statement that was knowingly or recklessly false would, if it were 
neither shown nor could reasonably be presumed to have had any harmful effects, still be 
protected by the First Amendment.”  Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574 n.6 (citation omitted).  Although 
the Court has stated in dicta that “an employee’s false criticism of his employer on grounds not 
of public concern may be cause for his discharge,” Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (2008), 
the question left open in Pickering concerning false statements about matters of public concern 
“has yet to arise in a government-employee retaliation case before the Supreme Court.”  
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Spacecon Specialty Contractors, LLC v. Bensinger, 713 F.3d 1028, 1052-53 (10th Cir. 2013) 
(Hartz, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).  Lacking Supreme Court guidance, lower courts have 
split on the issue. Some courts have held that false statements are per se unprotected under the 
First Amendment.  See, e.g., Westmoreland v. Sutherland, 662 F.3d 714, 721 (6th Cir. 2011) 
(citations omitted) (“Pickering balancing is not required if it is determined that the employee 
made statements with knowledge of, or reckless indifference to, their falsity.”); Brenner v. 
Brown, 36 F.3d 18, 20 (7th Cir. 1994) (“Any adverse employment action suffered by plaintiff was 
not the result of any protected speech; instead, it was a reasonable response by her employer to 
outrageous and unsupported defamatory remarks.”).  In contrast, other courts have rejected a 
per se approach, holding that false statements should be analyzed under the Pickering-balancing 
test.  See, e.g., Johnson v. Multnomah Cty., Oregon, 48 F.3d 420, 424 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he 
recklessness of the employee and the falseness of the statements should be considered in light of 
the public employer’s showing of actual injury to its legitimate interests, as part of the Pickering 
balancing test.”); Brasslett v. Cota, 761 F.2d 827, 840 (1st Cir. 1985) (examining “pertinent 
interest to be weighed” concerning the speech).   
[146]  See Gilchrist v. Citty, 173 F. App’x 675, 684-85 (10th Cir. 2006); Lynch v. City of 
Philadelphia, 166 F. Supp. 2d 224, 230 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (finding that where “no indication that 
[police officer] testified falsely or in a manner which would undermine” the police department, 
there was a genuine issue of material fact whether the speech was protected under the Pickering-
balancing test).   
[147]  511 U.S. 661 (1994). 
[148] See Swetlik v. Crawford, 738 F.3d 818, 828 (7th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted); Wright v. 
Ill. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 40 F.3d 1492, 1506 (7th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted); see 
also Waters, 511 U.S. at 685 (Souter, J., concurring) (asserting that the reasonableness test in 
the plurality opinion was approved by a majority of the Court and, therefore, constitutes a 
holding). 
[149]  Wright, 40 F.3d at 1505 (quoting O’Connor v. Steeves, 994 F.2d 905, 916 n.8 (1st Cir. 
1993)). 
[150]    Lane,  134 S. Ct. at 2379-80. 
[151]  See, e.g., Orange v. Dist. of Columbia, 59 F.3d 1267, 1272-73 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (noting that 
although university administrator’s “disclosure of … questionable billing practices . . . involved 
a ‘matter of public concern’ . . . the government’s interest in protecting the integrity of its 
[ongoing] investigation into fraud clearly outweighed whatever interest [the administrator] had 
in disclosing confidential information.”); see also Signore v. City of Montgomery, Ala., 354 F. 
Supp. 2d 1290, 1295-97 (M.D. Ala. 2005) (in a case involving a police department employee’s 
disclosure of theft of a department vehicle to a newspaper reporter, the employee’s speech was 
not entitled to protection under the First Amendment since his interest was outweighed by the 
city’s interest in ensuring efficient investigations by preserving, as confidential, details of a 
vehicle theft while the criminal investigation, and possibly internal affairs investigation, were 
ongoing); Barnhill v. Bd. of Regents of UW Sys., 479 N.W.2d 917, 926-28 (Wis. 1992) (reaching 
the same result as Signore, where a public university employee disclosed confidential survey 
results to a reporter).   
[152]  See Swartzwelder v. McNeilly, 297 F.3d 228, 239 (3d Cir. 2002). 
[153]  See Delano v. City of Buffalo, 45 F. Supp. 3d 297, 308, 310 (W.D.N.Y. 2014); Collins v. 
Gusman, No. 14–234, 2015 WL 1468298, at *6 (E.D. La. Mar. 30, 2015). 
[154]  See Diaz, supra note 116, at 595. 
[155]  See, 134 S. Ct. at 2381. 




[156]   See infra Part III.F.  
[157]  Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2381 n.5.  One judge, discussing Lane, has stated, “[a]lthough the act 
of testifying is protected, the testimony itself is not privileged.”  See Avila v. Los Angeles Police 
Dept., 758 F.3d 1096, 1106 (9th Cir. 2014) (Vinson, J., dissenting). 
[158]  Calpin v. Lackawanna Cty., No. 3:16-2013, 2017 WL 590277 (M.D. Pa. 2017); Lumpkin 
v. Aransas Cty., Texas. No. 2:15-CV-190, 2016 WL 7734607, at *7 (S.D. Tex. 2016). 
[159]  See, e.g., Lujan v. City of Santa Fe, 89 F. Supp. 3d 1109, 1158-59 (D.N.M. 2015) (citing 
Selmeczki v. New Mexico Dep’t of Corr., 129 P.3d 158, 163 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006)); Woods v. City 
of Berwyn, 2014 Ill. App. (1st) 133450 at ¶¶ 42-43, 20 N.E.3d 808, 816 (Ill. Ct. App. 2014).   
[160] 429 U.S. 274, 283-84 (1977). 
[161]  Id. at 287; see also Rivers v. New York City Hous. Auth., 176 F. Supp. 3d 229, 245 
(E.D.N.Y. 2016) (collecting cases on issue of whether the longstanding Mt. Healthy “substantial 
motivating factor” or recently-articulated Title VII “but-for” causation test applies to First 
Amendment retaliation claims).   
[162]  See John E. Rumel, Beyond Nexus: A Framework for Evaluating K-12 Teacher Off-Duty 
Conduct and Speech in Adverse Employment or Licensure Proceedings, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 685, 
705 (2015).   
[163]  See In re Stallworth, 26 A.3d 1059, 1061, 1067, 1070 (N.J. 2011) (progressive discipline); 
see also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985) (due process). 
[164]  See United States v. Anderson, 450 A.2d 446, 449 n.1 (D.C. Ct. A. 1982) (citing Garrity 
v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967)). This type of agreement would be akin to a “Reverse Garrity” 
warning, albeit in the public employment setting.  A Reverse Garrity warning “informs the 
employee that while a refusal to testify might have disciplinary or employment consequences, 
neither the statement itself, nor fruits of the statement will be used against him in any criminal 
proceedings.” Id.  
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Recent Developments is a regular feature of the Illinois Public Employee 
Relations Report.  It highlights recent legal developments of interest to the public 
employment relations community. This issue focuses on developments under the 
public employee collective bargaining statutes. 




In City Colleges Contingent Labor Organizing Committee and City Colleges of 
Chicago, 34 PERI ¶ 24 (IELRB July 20, 2017), the IELRB held that an arbitration 
award was not binding because the procedures through which it was issued were 
fundamentally unfair.  The City Colleges adopted a policy to avoid penalties due to 
re-employment of retirees.  The union grieved the policy and the matter proceeded 
to arbitration.  At the conclusion of the arbitration hearing, the union asked to 
make a closing oral argument and the employer asked to file a written brief.  The 
arbitrator granted both requests. 
 
Fifteen days prior to the deadline for the employer to file its brief, the arbitrator 
issued an award in which he noted that both parties had made oral closing 
arguments in lieu of filing briefs.  The arbitrator sustained the grievance in part. 
The City Colleges’ representative in the arbitration emailed the union’s 
representative expressing concern that the arbitrator had issued the award before 
the deadline for the employer’s brief. The union representative emailed the 
arbitrator and the City Colleges representative stating that the union had no 
objection to the arbitrator reopening the award to allow the arbitrator to consider 
the employer’s brief.  The arbitrator acknowledged his error and offered to convert 
his award to a draft and consider the employer’s brief before issuing a final award. 
The employer objected and, at the request of the union, the arbitrator reissued his 
award as a final award.  The employer refused to comply with the award. 
 
The IELRB held that the award was not binding because of the fundamental 
unfairness resulting from the arbitrator’s issuance of the award without waiting for 
and considering the employer’s brief.  The IELRB reasoned that the arbitrator’s 




error precluded the City Colleges from presenting its arguments before the 
arbitrator issued his award.  The IELRB held that the arbitrator’s offer to reopen 
the award did not cure the error because such a process could not ensure that the 
arbitrator would be able to ignore his initial ruling and give the matter a fresh 
consideration. Consequently, the IELRB concluded that City Colleges did not 
violate section 14(a)(8) of the IELRA by refusing to comply with the award. 
 
B. Duty to Bargain 
 
In AFSCME Council 31 and Northern Illinois University, 34 PERI ¶ 61 (IELRB 
Sept. 14, 2017), the IELRB held that Northern Illinois University violated section 
14(a)(5) and (1) of the IELRA when it increased staff parking fees while 
negotiations with AFSCME for a first contract were going on.  AFSCME had been 
certified as exclusive representative of a unit of clerical para-professional, technical 
and administrative employees.  While negotiations for a first contract were on-
going, the university announced an increase in fees for staff parking permits to take 
effect two months later.  The union demanded to bargain and the parties agreed to 
discuss parking fees during their next regularly scheduled bargaining session.  
About a month following the announcement, new parking permits went on sale 
and at least one bargaining unit member paid the higher fee.  The union demanded 
that the university rescind the fee increase as to the bargaining unit and reimburse 
any members who had already paid the higher fee.   The university asked the union 
for any proposals it had on the matter.  The union stated that discussion would be 
pointless until the status quo was reestablished.  
 
The IELRB held that by unilaterally increasing parking fees, a mandatory subject 
of bargaining, the university breached its duty to bargain. The IELRB rejected the 
university’s argument that the status quo with respect to parking fees included 
periodic fee increases. The IELRB observed that the university had increased 
parking fees in 2005, 2006, 2008 and 2011.  It concluded that there was no regular 
pattern of increasing parking fees, which had not been increased for several years 
before the onset of bargaining and thus fee increases were not part of the status 
quo.  The IELRB ordered the university to rescind the fee increase for bargaining 
unit members, make unit members whole and refrain from increasing parking fees 
without bargaining with the union. 
 
C. Representation Proceedings 
 
In University of Illinois and Illinois Federation of Public Employees, Local 4408, 
and Metropolitan Alliance of Police Chapter 738, 34 PERI ¶ 71 (IELRB Aug. 21, 
2017), the IELRB held that a grant of a unit clarification petition does not trigger a 
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one-year certification bar to the filing of a representation petition.  The university 
created the position of security officer and the Metropolitan Alliance of Police 
(MAP) filed a majority interest petition.  The university opposed  the petition 
arguing that a bargaining unit limited to security officers was not appropriate.  The 
Illinois Federation of Public Employees (IFPE) filed a unit clarification position 
seeking to include the security officers in a unit of security guards that IFPE had 
historically represented. MAP withdrew its majority interest petition and filed a 
representation petition for a combined unit of security guards and security officers. 
The Executive Director granted the unit clarification petition, found that the 
security officers should be included in the security guards unit and ordered an 
election to determine the employees’ choice of bargaining representative. IFPE 
filed exceptions to the Executive Director’s order of the representation election, 
arguing that the unit clarification should have triggered a one-year certification bar 
to any representation petition. 
 
The IELRB rejected IFPE’s argument. The IERLB reasoned that a unit clarification 
petition is granted only where the positions added to the unit are so similar to the 
positions already in the unit that no election or majority interest proceeding is 
necessary to determine the desires of the employees in the new positions.  In such 
circumstances, the bargaining representative does not need a year free from 
representation petitions to bargain on behalf of the newly added positions. 
Consequently, the IELRB affirmed the Executive Director’s order and remanded 
for further proceedings. 
II. IPRLA DEVELOPMENTS 
 
A. Bargaining Units 
 
In Teamsters Local 700 and Illinois State Toll Highway Authority, 34 PERI ¶ 41 
(ILRB State Panel June 13, 2017), the ILRB State Panel reversed an Administrative 
Law Judge’s decision granting a majority interest petition and held that a hearing 
was necessary to determine whether a bargaining unit of Intelligent 
Transportation System Field Technicians (ITS) was appropriate.  The State Panel 
observed that where an employer has an established centralized personnel system 
if a unit limited to a portion of employees in the same job classifications or a 
portion of employees performing similar duties is presumed inappropriate. The 
ILRB observed that in the proceeding before the ALJ, the employer identified 
positions that were not already represented by an exclusive bargaining 
representative and that were similar to the ITS technicians that the union sought 
to represent.  The ILRB held that the employer raised an issue of law or fact 




concerning the application of the presumption of inappropriateness that required 
an evidentiary hearing and remanded to the ALJ  to conduct such a hearing. 
 
B. Scope of Bargaining 
 
In State of Illinois, Department of Central Management Services and Troopers 
Lodge 41, Fraternal Order of Police, ILRB Case No. S-CB-16-023 (ILRB State 
Panel July 11, 2017), the ILRB State Panel held that health insurance premiums, 
deductibles, co-pays and out of pocket maximums are mandatory subjects of 
bargaining and the union did not commit an unfair labor practice when it 
submitted those issues to interest arbitration.  The ILRB rejected the State’s 
arguments that the State Employees Group Insurance Act, 5 ILCS 375, exempted 
these matters from bargaining. The State Panel observed that in 2004, section 
15(a) of the IPLRA was amended to provide that the IPLRA controls in case of 
conflict with any other law “other than Section 5 of the State Employees Group 
Health Insurance Act.” The State Panel reasoned that section 5 of the Group Health 
Insurance Act provides that contracts for health insurance are subject to 
appropriations and to the Illinois Procurement Code and requires the Director of 
Central Management Services to report to the Commission on Government 
Forecasting and Accountability on issues related to health insurance and 
procurement.  The ILRB found it significant that the IPLRA exempts from its 
control over conflicting laws only Section 5 of the Group Health Insurance Act, not 
the entire Group Health Insurance Act. The ILRB reasoned that if the legislature 
had intended to preempt bargaining over health insurance entirely, it would have 
expressly so stated.  
 
The State Panel also rejected State arguments that health insurance is specifically 
provided for in the Group Health Insurance Act and is therefore exempt from 
bargaining under section 7 of the IPLRA. The ILRB reasoned that the Group 
Insurance Act does not set premiums, deductibles, co-payments or out of pocket 
maximums and does not preclude collective bargaining. 
 
The State Panel applied the three-part general test for determining whether a 
matter is a mandatory subject of bargaining established in Central City Education 
Ass’n v. IELRB, 149 Ill.2d 496, 599 N.E.2d 892 (1992).  The ILRB held that health 
insurance unequivocally affected wages, hours and terms and conditions of 
employment. Because health insurance affects the State’s budget, the ILRB 
reasoned, it does raise an issue of inherent managerial authority, but the ILRB 
concluded that the benefits of bargaining with respect to premiums, deductibles, 
co-payments and out of pocket maximums outweighed  the burdens on managerial 
authority. On the other hand, the State Panel reasoned, choice of vendor and 
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procurement of health care do not bear on wages, hours and terms and conditions 
of employment and, therefore, are permissive subjects of bargaining. 
Member Snyder concurred in part and dissented in part.  He would have held that 
premiums are a mandatory subject of bargaining but that deductibles, co-
payments and out of pocket maximums are part of plan design that is a permissive 
subject.  In his view, the State was obligated to present the union with a specific 
plan design and then bargain over premiums for that design. 
